We consider zero-sum game which is usually called poker. Each of 
two players ( I and II ) independently draws a number ($x$ and 
$y$, respectively) according to uniform distribution in $[0,1]$. 
Also they jointly draw a number $z$ according to the 
distribution with cdf $F(z), 0<z<\infty$. After observing his 
number and the ``center card" $z$ each player chooses either to 
accept ($A$) or to reject ($R$) his number. If both players 
choose $A$, showdown is made and I wins (loses) if $x >(<) \ y$, 
getting reward $z\ (-z)$. If both players choose $R$, then the 
numbers are rejected and the game proceeds to the next round 
with the newly drawn numbers $x',y'$, and $z'$. If players 
choose different choices, then arbitration comes in, and forces 
to take the same choices as I's ( II's ) with probability $p\ (\bar
{p})$. Arbitration is fair (unfair) if $p=(\neq)\ \frac{1}{2}$. 
The game is played in $n$ rounds . Player I (II) aims to 
maximize (minimize) the expected reward to I. Explicit solution 
is derived to this sequential game, and examples are shown for 
the cases where $z$ obeys discrete and continuous uniform 
distributions.