A three-member committee wants to employ one specialist among $n$ applicants. The committee interviews applicants sequentially one-by-one. Facing each applicant each member chooses either $A$(=accept) or $R$(=reject). If choices are different, odd-man's judgement is not neglected and he can make some arbitration for deciding the committee's $A$ or $R$. Let $(X_j, Y_j, Z_j)$ be the evaluations of the $j$-th applicant's ability by the committee members, where $X_j, Y_j, Z_j$ are {\it i.i.d.} with $U_{[0, 1]}$ distribution. Each member of the committee wants to maximize the expected value $u_n$ of the applicant accepted by the committee. This three-player two-choice multistage game is formulated and is given a solution, as a function of $p\in [0, \frac12]$ {\it i.e.}, odd-man's power of arbitration. It is shown that $u_n\uparrow u_\infty(p)$ and $u_\infty(p)$ decreases as $p\in[0, \frac12]$ increases.